This pattern of verbal behavior in mimetics is performative (Austin 1962) on two points: first, if mimetics are not verbalized, the situation will not be apparent during the verbalization, and second, if mimetics are verbalized, this alone will make the situation apparent during the verbalization (iii) This performative characteristic of mimetics is something that people utilize. This pragmatic behavior is hardly seen in other Yamato, Chinese, or foreign loan words and can be called a characteristic of mimetics. Yamato, Chinese, and foreign loan words, as well (ii) In cases where mimetics are not joined with other words, they are spoken isolated from other sententil elements. More specifically, the following four points are examined: (i) The morphological, syntactic, semantic patterns often seen in mimetics, in which they are joined with other words in the sentence, such as an adjective noun, verb stem, or adverb, to illustrate or embellish descriptions more vividly, is not a characteristic of mimetics as they can be seen in other classifications of Japanese words, i.e.
this fact, and using the results of a questionnaire, it presents the possibility that machines may collaborate with humans by using mimetics in the manner of humans. The performative characteristic of mimetics is utilized in the context of human play.
This pragmatic behavior is characteristically performative (cf. Rather, they are a pragmatic behavior, spoken isolated from other sentential elements. In this paper, the author argues that mimetics are not morphological, syntactic, semantic phenomena by nature. Whether we consider, with Austin, that speech acts ‘imply’ mental states or, with Searle, that they ‘express’ them, we could only make sense of this idea if we considered utterances as criteria for intentions, and not as alleged behavioural effects of hidden mental causes. I propose an alternative ‘criterial’ account of the role of intentions in speech acts theory, and analyse Austin's and Searle's approaches in the light of this Wittgensteinian concept. I would thus like to deny a merely ‘symptomatic’ account of intentions, according to which we could never make anything but fallible hypotheses about the effective occurrence of any speech act. With this qualification in mind, I argue against the idea that intentions-considered as mental states accomplishing a causal role in the performance of the act-should be considered among the necessary conditions of speech acts. What makes a speech act a speech act? Which are its necessary and sufficient conditions? I claim in this paper that we cannot find an answer to those questions in Austin's doctrine of the infelicities, since some infelicities take place in fully committing speech acts, whereas others prevent the utterance from being considered as a speech act at all.
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